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The topic is attractive: decolonisation is an important parameter of contemporary 
international relations, but has been rather neglected by scholars of the discipline. 
However, our current post-bipolar system, emancipated from the East-West cleavage, 
is probably more dependent on the colonial legacy and decolonisation process than 
ever. The appearance of such a book is thus both timely and precious: written by 
two German scholars, teaching in Germany and USA, it comes out as a translation 
of a first German edition. At a first glance, we wholeheartedly share the main 
arguments: decolonisation seals the end of a racial hierarchy which played a major 
(and underestimated) role in past international relations (p1); it marks also the end 
of a kind of imperial system, even if we have to wary on this point, while imperial 
orientations are nowadays visible everywhere around the world ; it deeply affected 
the succeeding international systems, as it was violent, long and extensive (all the 
continents were concerned). Precisely for all these reasons, the process was not 
studied enough and decolonisation, as an explaining variable, was much neglected 
by IR researches.
From this point of view, the book can be considered as helpful in two ways. 
First, it offers an exact chronology of a very long and complex process, pointing 
that decolonisation had two “proto-waves”, with America (1770-1820) and then the 
British dominions, before being completed in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Second, it suggests some stimulating lines of research, about the main causes of the 
process (pp. 22ff.), and about the explaining theories which should be mobilised (pp. 
29ff.). In addressing the causes, the authors properly point that they are to be found 
in the domestic transformations of the colonial power, as well as in the local colonial 
context and the global international system: these three levels of explanation are 
excellent starting points for a good program of research.
In spite of these qualities, the book seems, in total, rather disappointing. Of 
course, it does not pretend to offer a final treaty on the topic: however, it does not 
provide any new information that we were missing before opening it, nor any data 
on decolonisation. It does not seem to be built on real empirical (or even historical) 
research. For instance, it would have been useful, even for reinforcing the main 
arguments, to take into account the itineraries of some of the decolonisation leaders as 
well as their way of socialisation. It would have explained how anti-colonialist actors 
could transform themselves into importers of Western models that they discovered, 
learned and internalised when they studied in the USA (N’Krumah, Azikiwe, …), 
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in the United Kingdom (Nehru, Jinnah, Tafawa Belawa…) or in France (Senghor, 
Cesaire), even when they sat in the Western Parliament (SekouToure, Houphouet-
Boigny)…
It follows that three critical points are well worth discussing, particularly when 
we refer to the questions listed in the preface of the book. The first one appears as the 
most important: can we consider decolonisation as a precursor to nationalism? Is it the 
last hurdle before nation-building? The theoretical main stream of political science 
considered take it as granted, while developmentalism made it the corner stone of its 
theories. This postulate is particularly strong and is even a key argument for those 
who consider universalism and evolutionism as the real bases of political science: but 
it is probably where the rubber hits the road. Recent works have clearly shown that 
emancipating movements coming from colonised countries were oriented against 
slavery, colonialism and imperialism, but did not have any nationalist substance.1
Two major consequences flow from this historical observation. The first one 
is just glimpsed in the last pages of the book (pp. 150ff.): nation is not the only 
model promoted by the independence leaders, some of them supporting federalism 
as a substitute to the nation-building process. But a second consequence is much 
more important for properly grasping what decolonisation was, and how it finally 
failed: there was a permanent hiatus between decolonisation and state-building 
which paved the way to permanent and dramatic political instability. The most 
uncompromising anticolonial leaders were mainly interested in condemning social 
and political inequality, but most of them were however keen to participate in the 
political administration of their countries from the moment that the colonial power 
respected equal rights of both colonised people and colonisers. Ho Chi Minh even 
requested in his youth to become a colonial administrator, while the Nigerian leader 
Namdhi Azikiwe planned to become a foreign service official in Liberia…The idea of 
nation was not in mind of these leaders: N’krumah campaigned for pan-Africanism 
rather than building a nation in Gold Coast, while the first pan-Africanist congresses, 
in London, Brussels or Paris filled the room by gathering activists from African, 
Caribbean, or American black communities. The same is true in Asia, with pan-
Asianism or in the Arab World with pan-Arabism, brought by Gamal Abdel Nasser 
as well as the Baath Party. We can say that decolonisation can be then defined as the 
inability to make the connection between before and after the break. This dysfunction 
is most probably the main crisis affecting still now our current international system.
The second question refers to the decolonisation strategy as it should have been 
conceived by the colonial power. The authors sagaciously point out that the process 
was partly strategic and partly constrained by local pressures and the evolution of 
the international context: Cold war and bipolarity obviously boosted decolonisation 
policies. They also rightly stress that postcolonial studies were not able to bring 
new convincing explanations on these strategies. But they probably underestimate 
the important networks which had been progressively weaved, even before formal 
independence, for creating and promoting clientelist relationships between the 
former colonial power and the new states which were emerging. The efficiency of 
these new linkages stems from different factors: the socialisation of the new elite that 
we already mentioned, growing international interdependence which complemented 
1  Michael Goebel, Paris, capitale du tiers monde. Comment est née la révolution anticoloniale (1919–1939), 
Paris, La Découverte, 2017. The book offers a wonderful vision on the « pre-decolonization » movement, and 
then on the real nature of the anticolonial movement.
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the globalisation process, the rising role of transnational actors (multinational firms, 
religious organisations, and particularly new religious movements, NGOs…) who 
promptly played a mediatory role…For this reason, it seems strange to suggest 
(p.  150) that former colonial powers were “wary  of meddling into the domestic 
affairs of the new states”… Quite the opposite, this new interfering system is at the 
core of the decolonisation process and sheds light on its circumstances. It helps also 
to build up a typology of these processes which is lacking in the book: decolonisation 
in Ivory Coast, in Algeria, in Angola or in Congo did not have the same aspects as it 
could not promote the same types of post-colonial clientelisation.
The third question refers to the subsequent cleavages which appeared in the 
international arena. The authors equate the West-East conflict and the new North-
South opposition (p. 140), even if they point the cases of North Korea and Cuba as 
exceptions, as they were attracted into the Soviet camp. Strangely, South Korea is not 
mentioned, on the basis of reciprocity, as affiliated to the Western camp, nor South 
Vietnam, nor the multiple alliances which formalised the Western clientelisation of 
several decolonised new states, through CENTO, OTASE, ASEAN and a proliferation 
of military bilateral agreements passed by the United States, France or the United 
Kingdom… In fact, the attractive capacity of the Western camp and the ability to 
formalise it was much stronger than it was in the opposite camp! 
In fact, the two cleavages were totally different: the first was a moment of World 
history. Strategically conceived and clearly embodied in an explicit ideological 
competition, it strongly shaped and structured the international system from 1947 to 
1989. Conversely, the second is not strictly speaking able to structure the international 
system: the South is not unified, but is rather fragmented, while no organised military 
alliances are able to create competing camps. We do not find any kind of frontal 
oppositions, but, instead of it, a strong evidence of a lack of international integration 
which results in many kinds of tension, humiliation and frustration. That is to say, the 
“North-South opposition” comes within a new kind of international system which 
is quite unprecedented: it stems from a dramatic asymmetry rather than a traditional 
balance of power. This specific structuration explain the particular aspect of the new 
violence and the new conflictuality.
Decolonisation is thus a very complex process which totally disturbed the 
traditional organisation of the international arena. That is why it is frustrating to see 
only the shell of things. The topic would have deserved a deeper investigation. Even 
if the book pretended to be a simple introduction to further investigations, we regret 
that the basic questions were not set up with more attention. 
